The ongoing internationalization of business activity fuels concerns that governments may lose their ability to tax business income. By using data on sixteen German states from 1970 to 2005, we estimate the impact of internationalization, measured by trade volumes and stocks of foreign direct investment, on business tax revenues. We control for the impact of internationalization on business profits. Surprisingly, we find strong and robust evidence for a positive impact of internationalization on tax revenue. An increase in the internationalization indicator of ten percent increases tax revenue by over three percent. This counterintuitive result may be explained by higher tax avoidance activity of purely national firms or by legal provisions in the tax law which can be used as tax loopholes in the case of domestic transactions as opposed to cross-border transactions.
Introduction
The internationalization of business activity proceeds at a fast pace while tax policy is still a task of national governments and international tax cooperation is weak. There is the widespread impression among policy-makers and economists that this asymmetry J. Becker ( ) · C. Fuest Saïd Business School, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK e-mail: johannes.becker2@sbs.ox.ac.uk C. Fuest e-mail: clemens.fuest@sbs.ox.ac.uk in internationalization undermines the ability of governments to tax business income.
In this paper, we analyze empirically whether internationalization drives down tax revenues when tax rates and profits are controlled for. We test this hypothesis using local business tax revenue data from sixteen German states ("Länder") and statespecific data which allow us to construct openness or internationalization measures. Although the German states share a common legal framework for border crossing economic activity, they vary considerably (both across states and time) in the degree to which their regional economies are linked to foreign countries through trade and foreign direct investment. Controlling for state-specific fixed effects, we exploit the variation over time to investigate the relationship between internationalization and tax revenues.
Internationalization may affect tax revenues through at least three channels. Firstly, governments may deliberately lower taxes in response to the increased mobility of capital and business profits. Secondly, becoming international may have an effect on productivity and, thus, profits of firms, which then translates into larger business tax revenues. Thirdly, multinational enterprises (MNEs) may decrease their effective tax burden themselves, i.e. avoid taxes by shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. We use a set of control variables, like tax rates and gross operating surplus, to account for the first two channels and, thus, concentrate on the third channel.
It is important to be precise about the causal effects we set out to measure. The hypothesis we pursue is that more internationalized states collect less business tax revenues even if tax rates and profits are controlled for. There are two potential objections in terms of causality. On the one hand, certain regions may host specific types of firms which have both a high propensity to internationalize and superior tax avoidance techniques (for given profit levels). Then, internationalization and tax revenue are driven by some unobservable factor. Due to data limitations, we cannot rule out this kind of causal relationship. On the other hand, differences in internationalization may be caused by tax policy itself. Here, our approach has the advantage that tax legislation in Germany is made at the federal level. Local governments may set the tax rate of the local business tax, but the tax base is uniform. The German states have no autonomy in tax policy, apart from the fact that they are responsible for tax administration. Later on, we discuss if and how this may affect the validity of our results.
We measure internationalization by, firstly, state-specific data on trade flows between a state and foreign countries and, secondly, stocks of foreign direct investment both inbound and outbound. Trade and investment linkages to other German states may be neglected for the following reason. Within Germany, the local business tax base of firms with plants in more than one local jurisdiction is apportioned according to payroll. This implies that firms cannot shift book profits from high to low-tax jurisdictions within Germany through instruments like intra firm debt or transfer pricing. Thus, there is a priori no reason to believe that openness towards other German states should affect tax revenues in the same way as does openness towards the rest of the world. However, if trade or investment linkages to the rest of the world affect tax revenue in one German state, tax revenue in other states may also be affected due to formula apportionment of taxable income. In principle, this weakens the effects we set out to measure. As this effect does not occur in jurisdictions with separate
